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THERE’S NOTHING RATIONAL ABOUT IT: HEIGHTENED
SCRUTINY FOR SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS LONG OVERDUE
DANIEL J. GALVIN, JR.*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, I argue that sexual orientation meets the burden
established by Supreme Court jurisprudence for suspect classification
and, therefore, should receive heightened scrutiny under Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection analysis. After decades of using the fun-
damental rights analysis to aid lesbian, gay, and bisexual individu-
als in their pursuit of equality, addressing the fundamental right to
marry and the fundamental right to privacy, the Supreme Court must
address the elephant in the courtroom: that sexual orientation meets
all of the factors set by the Court in equal protection cases for sus-
pect classification.
Gays, lesbians, and bisexual individuals (LGBs)1 meet the burden
for suspectness in that they are a discrete and insular minority,
with a long history of discrimination, and are effectively politically
powerless. Furthermore, sexual orientation is an immutable charac-
teristic, irrelevant to an individual’s ability to participate in and
contribute to society. While the Supreme Court has not determined
which factors are weighed more heavily than others in its award of
suspect classification, sexual orientation meets all of the factors
addressed by the Court in previous cases and therefore must be a
suspect class and granted heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
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1. In this Article, the issue of sexual orientation will be analyzed under equal
protection analysis. Gender identity, commonly identified as the “T” in LGBT, will not
be addressed.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2015, same-sex marriage was universally recognized
in the United States with the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell
v. Hodges.2 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, found
that marriage is a fundamental right which cannot be denied to same-
sex couples because of the nature of their same-sex relationship.3
This decision was a victory for proponents of gay rights and equal-
ity.4 However, at no point did the Supreme Court’s decision make
reference to sexual orientation as a suspect class or analyze the facts
of the case under a suspect classification framework.5 At a time
2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
3. Id.
4. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Rules Gay Couples Nationwide Have a Right to
Marry, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gay-mar
riage-and-other-major-rulings-at-the-supreme-court/2015/06/25/ef75a120-1b6d-11e5-bd
7f-4611a60dd8e5_story.html?utm_term=.3f4118d01d05 [https://perma.cc/584Q-B8GY].
5. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–600.
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when sexual orientation rights seem to permeate the docket of the
Supreme Court,6 the fact that the Court fails to recognize the appli-
cability of suspect classification to the analysis of civil rights cases
affecting the LGBT community requires immediate remedy.7 In this
Article, I argue that given the current state of equal protection juris-
prudence, sexual orientation should be granted suspect classifica-
tion. Part I will outline the history of equal protection jurisprudence
by evaluating the stare decisis that created and further molded the
current five-factor balancing test the Court uses in determining
suspectness. Part II will examine the history of LGB rights through
the Supreme Court, from the first decision mentioning the LGB com-
munity to the landmark marriage cases recognizing the fundamental
right of marriage for all, including the LGB community. Part II will
also elaborate on the current discriminatory issues the LGB commu-
nity faces without laws protecting them as a suspect class. Part III
will argue that sexual orientation, as a suspect class, meets all of
the burdens established by the Supreme Court for suspect classifica-
tion. Therefore, Part III will argue that since sexual orientation meets
the standard for suspectness under the current equal protection anal-
ysis, heightened scrutiny should be granted. Part III will also address
the support the LGB community has received for granting suspect
classification. The Conclusion reports that sexual orientation is a
suspect class requiring heightened scrutiny.
I. FROM CIVIL WAR TO CIVIL RIGHTS: A HISTORY OF
EQUAL PROTECTION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
states, “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”8 Originally ratified to protect slaves
emancipated after the Civil War via the Thirteenth Amendment,9 the
Clause did not see traction in the Supreme Court until the Warren
Court in the 1950s.10 The idea that certain classes required height-
ened review at the Supreme Court under Equal Protection analyses
6. See id. at 2593; United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013);
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., v.
Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. ___ (2018).
7. See Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political
Power of LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 385, 386 (2010).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135,
142 (2011).
10. Id. at 142–43.
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was first introduced in United States v. Carolene Products Co.11 The
case involved whether the Filled Milk Act, which prohibited interstate
commerce of certain milk products, violated the Fifth Amendment.12
However, it was the fourth footnote of the opinion which introduced
the idea of heightened scrutiny.13 Justice Stone, author of the now
famous footnote,14 wrote a “more searching judicial inquiry” was
necessary when the “operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities” was prejudiced against a “dis-
crete and insular minorit[y].”15 Justice Stone suggested that in cases
where a minority group is prevented from challenging a law which it
believes discriminates against it through legislative means as a
result of its minority status, a heightened level of judicial scrutiny
may be required to analyze the issue.16 This footnote became the
cornerstone of equal protection jurisprudence as the Court began to
determine which classes required heightened scrutiny.17
The first mention by the Court of any suspect class requiring
heightened scrutiny arose out of Korematsu v. United States.18 Be-
cause the Court had not established any type of conjunctive elemental
test or factor balancing test at the time,19 the Court simply estab-
lished “that [where] all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group are immediately suspect. . . . [C]ourts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”20 The Court, however, ac-
knowledged that while race may fall into a class which requires
heightened scrutiny, the applicability of the standard does not neces-
sarily mean that the challenged law will be declared unconstitu-
tional.21 While the Court implemented heightened scrutiny under a
theory of suspect classification for race, ab initio, in Korematsu, it
failed to outline the requirements for such a classification.22 It was
not until the case of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez that the Court even used the term “suspect class” for the
first time and provided examples of criteria used to determine sus-
pectness.23 San Antonio Independent School District raised the issue
11. Id. at 143.
12. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 145–46 (1938).
13. Id. at 152 n.4.
14. See Strauss, supra note 9, at 143.
15. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 154 n.4.
16. Id.
17. See Strauss, supra note 9, at 144.
18. Id. (discussing race as a class worthy of “the most rigid scrutiny”).
19. See id.
20. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
21. Id.
22. See Strauss, supra note 9, at 144.
23. Id. at 145.
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of suspect classification for poor school districts.24 Rejecting suspect
classification for the school districts, the Court introduced what it
coined “traditional indicia of suspectness,” namely: “the class is not
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of politi-
cal powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.”25 The addition of analyzing the history
of discrimination as well as “political powerlessness”26 created two new
factors in a balancing test with the “discrete and insular” minority.27
In the same year as San Antonio Independent School District,
the Court also decided in Frontiero v. Richardson that two additional
factors were prominent in its determination of suspectness: “whether
a group’s defining characteristic was relevant to its ability to per-
form or contribute to society, and the immutability of that trait.”28
The same factors were used three years later in Craig v. Boren in
granting a new level of scrutiny to gender, intermediate scrutiny.29
This quasi-suspect classification was created because a person’s
gender has no relevance to his or her ability to contribute to society,
and because gender, determined at birth, is an immutable charac-
teristic of that person’s being.30 While not going so far as to grant
strict scrutiny review to gender as a classification, intermediate scru-
tiny review creates a heightened level of review.31
The questions that must now be answered are what these differ-
ent scrutiny levels mean and how they are applied. In cases involving
non-suspect classes, rational basis scrutiny is used.32 Established in
McCulloch v. Maryland,33 rational basis scrutiny requires that
“[t]hose challenging . . . a law have the burden to establish that the
law is not rationally related to any legitimate government purpose.”34
Intermediate scrutiny, granted to “quasi-suspect” classes such as gen-
der and illegitimacy,35 assigns those challenging a law the burden
24. Id.
25. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
26. Id.
27. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
28. Strauss, supra note 9, at 145. The Court weighed these factors in determining
whether gender should be a suspect class worthy of strict scrutiny, ultimately finding
5–4 that it was not. Id. at 145 n.50.
29. Id. at 145 n.50 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
30. Strauss, supra note 9, at 145.
31. Id. at 145 n.50.
32. Id. at 135–36.
33. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 437 (1819) (establishing judicial review
of laws challenged under the Constitution).
34. Strauss, supra note 9, at 136 (footnote omitted).
35. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (granting gender quasi-suspect
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of showing “[s]uch laws” are not “substantially related to an important
government purpose.”36 Finally, strict scrutiny, granted to suspect
classes such as race and national origin,37 requires the government
show a “compelling purpose for the distinction drawn and prove that
such a classification is necessary to achieve that purpose.”38 This Arti-
cle argues that sexual orientation, currently analyzed under rational
basis scrutiny,39 should receive heightened scrutiny because sexual
orientation meets the factors established by the Supreme Court
through its equal protection jurisprudence. In order to do so effec-
tively, a full understanding of each of the factors in the balancing test
must be explained.
A. A Discrete and Insular Minority
The first factor a court may weigh in determining the suspect-
ness of a proposed class is the class’s status as a discrete and insular
minority.40 Writing about the application of this standard, Professor
Marcy Strauss states, “courts often conclusorily asserted that a partic-
ular group was or was not a discrete and insular minority.”41 However,
she further contends, “[p]erhaps the most widely accepted explana-
tion for the terms ‘discrete and insular minority’ is that suggested
by Professor Bruce Ackerman.”42 His article Beyond Carolene Products
suggests “[a] group is discrete if they are visible in a way that makes
them ‘relatively easy for others to identify’ ”43 and “[a] group is insu-
lar if they tend to interact with each other with ‘great frequency in a
variety of social contexts.’ ”44 Strauss argues that “courts today mea-
sure suspectness” by “a group’s political power, history of discrimina-
tion, and immutability” in order “to implement the theory behind
Footnote 4 [sic] of Carolene Products rather than by attempting to
define the phrase ‘discrete and insular.’ ”45
classification, and granting intermediate scrutiny); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767
(1977) (granting illegitimacy quasi-suspect classification, and granting intermediate
scrutiny).
36. Strauss, supra note 9, at 137 (footnote omitted).
37. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (ruling
that classifications of race and national origin are subject to strict scrutiny).
38. Strauss, supra note 9, at 137 (footnote omitted).
39. See Powers, supra note 7, at 387 (stating that the Supreme Court has yet to apply
heightened scrutiny to statutes distinguishing on the basis of sexual orientation).
40. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
41. Strauss, supra note 9, at 149 (footnote omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV.
713, 729 (1985)).
44. Id. (quoting Ackerman, supra note 43, at 726).
45. Strauss, supra note 9, at 150.
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This is supported in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Massachu-
setts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, the Court, in a per curiam opin-
ion, opined that a “discrete and insular group” is one which requires
“extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”46
The Court, however, also stated “that a suspect class is one ‘saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful un-
equal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.’ ”47 If one looks at the language between those two
phrases, one will observe the Court equates a discrete and insular
group with one “saddled with . . . disabilities,” a history of discrimi-
nation, and political powerlessness.48 There is a strong argument that,
as Professor Strauss opines, discrete and insular minority is merely
an all-encompassing, umbrella term for the subsequent factors the
Court looks at in determining suspectness.49 If that is the current
status of this factor in equal protection suspect classification balanc-
ing, then it is necessary to understand the subsequent factors estab-
lished by the Court.
B. History of Discrimination
A class aiming for suspect classification must show a history of
discrimination.50 Professor Strauss argues that “[a] history of dis-
crimination is relevant to a group’s suspect status because it is con-
nected to the group’s political power and indicates whether the
legislative process has failed to protect it, warranting judicial inter-
vention.”51 Because the Court established race as a suspect class, ab
initio, in Korematsu, the Court never addressed the history of dis-
crimination as a factor in its ruling.52 It was not until Frontiero v.
Richardson that the Court addressed the issue of a history of dis-
crimination in its determination of suspectness.53 The Court stated
plainly, “[t]here can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”54 The Court then went on
to explain the history of “romantic paternalism” which it explained
“put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”55 The Court addressed
46. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Strauss, supra note 9, at 150.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
53. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
54. Id. (footnote omitted).
55. Id.
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the stereotypes and distinctions between the sexes, and even com-
pared the status of women “to that of blacks under the pre–Civil
War slave codes.”56 It further opined that “women still face perva-
sive . . . discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job
market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.”57
In doing so, the Court granted suspect status to gender as a class
and utilized strict scrutiny.58 Three years later, the Court changed
its analysis of gender as a suspect class, utilizing the “important gov-
ernmental objectives” test weighed against a “substantially related”
goal,59 creating what is known today as intermediate scrutiny.60 The
Court’s ability to examine the history of gender discrimination,
citing cases and social mores which perpetuated systemic sexism,
shows it is capable of undertaking a thoughtful process for other
suspect or quasi-suspect classes.61
C. Political Powerlessness
The next prong the Court considers in determining whether a
class is suspect is the class’s political powerlessness.62 “Political pow-
erlessness refers to a group’s inability to rely on the legislative process
to protect its interest.”63 The goal of the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause is to protect against discrimination based
on class, and it is for that reason courts view this factor as one of the
most important in protecting the class against a legislature with an
inherent bias against the group.64 Professor Strauss narrows this
factor down to four possible approaches: “(1) the group’s ability to
vote; (2) the pure numbers of the group; (3) the existence of favor-
able legislative enactments that might demonstrate political power;
and (4) whether members of the group have achieved positions of
power and authority.”65
Certainly in Frontiero and Boren, the Court analyzed the his-
tory of voting rights in its determination of suspectness.66 The Court
56. Id. at 685.
57. Id. (footnote omitted).
58. See id. at 690–91.
59. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
60. Strauss, supra note 9, at 137.
61. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684–85.
62. Strauss, supra note 9, at 153.
63. Id. (footnote omitted).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 154.
66. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685 (explaining that while blacks were granted the
right to vote in 1870, women did not receive the right to vote until the ratification of the
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has also analyzed a group’s inability to vote in Foley v. Connelie, where
it ruled aliens receive strict scrutiny because they “have no direct
voice in the political process.”67 While a group’s inability to vote has
been analyzed, it may be indicative of political powerlessness.68
“[B]lacks, women, indigents, and illegitimates may all vote, and yet
all are politically powerless.”69
Footnote Four of Carolene Products first addressed the issue of
the population of a group as a factor in Equal Protection rationale,
noting that “exacting judicial scrutiny” may be necessary to deter-
mine the constitutionality of laws affecting “racial minorities” which
Justice Stone determined “tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities.”70 The entire point behind Footnote Four is that a group
that does not have the numbers to protect itself against the will of
the majority should be able to rely on the courts to extend height-
ened scrutiny in determining whether the law is unconstitutional.71
The third prong of powerlessness the Court looks to is current
laws favoring the group seeking suspect classification.72 Interest-
ingly enough, the major application of this prong in Supreme Court
jurisprudence did not arise out of a case awarding suspect classifica-
tion, but rather denying it.73 In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
the Court ruled that the “mentally retarded have a reduced ability
to cope with and function in the everyday world.”74 They further
opined that mental retardation is an immutable characteristic.75 How-
ever the Court, in addressing laws favorable to the mentally disabled,
found that “the distinctive legislative response” to the mentally dis-
abled “demonstrate[d] . . . that the lawmakers ha[d] been addressing
their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or
prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the
judiciary.”76 The Court went on to list several instances where legisla-
tures, “both national and state” had passed laws protecting the men-
tally disabled, including the Developmental Disabilities Assistance
Nineteenth Amendment); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976) (explaining the
traditional role of women in the home rather than “the marketplace and world of ideas”).
67. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (involving a New York statute which
prohibited non-citizens from becoming police officers).
68. Strauss, supra note 9, at 154.
69. Id. (footnote omitted).
70. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
71. See id.
72. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
73. Id. at 442 (denying quasi-suspect classification to the mentally disabled).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 438.
76. Id. at 443.
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and Bill of Rights Act, the Education of the Handicapped Act, and the
Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977.”77 By passing laws specifically
tailored to assist the mentally disabled, “the legislative response . . .
negate[d] any claim that the mentally retarded are politically pow-
erless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention
of the lawmakers.”78 Regardless of the unsuccessful application to
award suspect classification to the mentally disabled, Cleburne dem-
onstrates the Court’s ability to analyze the current state of laws favor-
ing a prospective class.79
The final prong of powerlessness is whether members of the
proposed class have attained positions of power and authority.80 In
Frontiero, the Court noted the appellee’s argument that “women still
are not engaged in politics, the professions, business, or industry to
the extent that men are.”81 As of 2017, there are twenty-one female
senators (21%) and 105 congresswomen (19.6%) serving in Congress.82
In statewide executive offices, women hold 23.7% of elected positions.83
Over thirty years after the decision in Frontiero, there is still a clear
gender gap in politics in a society where women make up 50% of the
population.84 The same issue faces racial minorities.85 As of 2017,
19% of the 115th Congress is non-white, even though racial minori-
ties compose 38% of the population of the United States.86 While there
has been a great increase in minority representation in government,87
including the election of Barack Obama as the first black President
of the United States in 2008,88 white senators and congressmen still
“account for 81% of the current Congress but represent just 62% of
the population.”89 Political powerlessness can be measured by any
77. Id. at 443–44.
78. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445.
79. See id. at 465.
80. Strauss, supra note 9, at 154.
81. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973).
82. Women in Elective Office 2017, CTR. AM. WOMEN & POL. (2017), http://www.cawp
.rutgers.edu/women-elective-office-2017 [https://perma.cc/GX3P-3TLH].
83. Id.
84. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 683; Population, Female (% of Total), WORLD BANK
(2017), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS?locations=US [https://
perma.cc/5YRS-AZLJ]; Women in Elective Office 2017, supra note 82.
85. See Kristen Bialik & Jens Manuel Krogstad, 115th Congress Sets New High for
Racial, Ethnic Diversity, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org
/fact-tank/2017/01/24/115th-congress-sets-new-high-for-racial-ethnic-diversity [https://
perma.cc/5JSD-5TUE].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Adam Nagourney, Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05elect.html [https://perma
.cc/T2RZ-AK8D].
89. Bialik & Krogstad, supra note 85.
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of these prongs, and yet, the fact remains that even with Equal Pro-
tection advances, racial minorities and women are still vastly under-
represented in elected office.
D. Immutability
Immutability, or a trait not easily changed,90 is another factor the
Court utilizes in determining suspectness.91 The Court in Frontiero
explained its interpretation of immutability opining that sex, race,
and national origin, all suspect classes under equal protection juris-
prudence, are immutable simply because they are an “accident of
birth”92 meaning that an immutable characteristic is one not easily
changed.93 In its opinion in Plyler v. Doe, the court found that undoc-
umented status was not “an absolutely immutable characteristic
since it is the product of conscious . . . action.”94 The Court further
elaborated on the status of immutability in Mathews v. Lucas, com-
paring the immutable status of illegitimacy to that of race and gen-
der, “a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of
the illegitimate individual.”95 Understanding immutability and the
application of this standard is crucial to understanding which pros-
pective classes meet the burden of suspectness.
E. Relevancy of the Trait in Participating and Contributing to
Society
In determining suspectness, “[c]ourts also consider the rele-
vancy of a group’s defining characteristic or whether the trait bears
a relation to the individual’s ability to participate and contribute to
society.”96 In Frontiero, the Court ruled that “sex . . . bears no rela-
tion to ability to perform or contribute to society.”97 Consequently, the
Court found that because one’s gender does not determine one’s ability
to participate in society, any “statutory distinctions”98 discriminate
90. See Strauss, supra note 9, at 162.
91. Id.
92. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
93. See Strauss, supra note 9, at 162.
94. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (determining that withholding education
rights from the child of an undocumented alien was unconstitutional because the same
educational opportunities were offered to children of documented aliens and citizens).
95. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (deciding that illegitimacy is granted
intermediate scrutiny, but not strict scrutiny as race and national origin).
96. Strauss, supra note 9, at 165 (footnote omitted).
97. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 686–87.
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against women “without regard to the actual capabilities of its indi-
vidual members.”99 Because gender bore no relevance to an individ-
ual’s ability to participate in society, in addition to the previously
stated factors, suspect classification was granted to gender.100 The
Court in Cleburne found the opposite in rejecting suspect classifica-
tion for the mentally disabled.101 In the majority opinion, Justice
Byron White wrote,
[I]t is undeniable, and it is not argued otherwise here, that those
who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and
function in the everyday world. Nor are they all cut from the same
pattern: . . . they range from those whose disability is not imme-
diately evident to those who must be constantly cared for. . . . [I]n
relevant respects . . . the States’ interest in dealing with and
providing for them is plainly a legitimate one.102
The Court explained that mental disability was, in fact, the very
reason why a disabled individual’s disability was relevant to his or
her ability to function in society.103 In another case denying suspect
classification, the Court ruled that age, unlike race or gender, “can-
not be characterized as ‘so seldom relevant to the achievement of
any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such consider-
ations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.’ ”104 The Court
explained that there are times where laws which classify based on
age serve a legitimate government interest because of age and thus
failed to grant age suspect classification.105
The Court, through its jurisprudence, has accepted these factors
as instrumental in determining suspectness.106 Beginning with Foot-
note Four in Justice Stone’s opinion in United States v. Carolene
Products through cases involving rational basis scrutiny for age and
mental disability, the Court has outlined the “test” for suspectness.107
Moving forward, the Court has the opportunity to use this test in
granting suspect classification to another class, sexual orientation.
99. Id. at 687.
100. Id. at 686, 688. Craig v. Boren reduced the level of scrutiny to intermediate and
awarded gender quasi-suspect classification in 1976. Strauss, supra note 9, at 137 n.12.
101. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
102. Id. (footnotes omitted).
103. Id.
104. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S.
at 440).
105. Id. at 83.
106. Strauss, supra note 9, at 146.
107. Id. at 143, 146.
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e Rise: The History of Gay Rights from One, Inc. to
Unlike race, which has faced and received legal protections from
forms of discrimination over the past 160 years,108 and gender, which
has faced and received legal protections from discrimination dating
back to the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment,109 sexual ori-
entation has only become a major issue in the past sixty years.110 In
order to understand how sexual orientation adheres to the current
suspect classification standard, the history of LGB rights in Su-
preme Court lore must be understood.
The first case the Supreme Court ruled on which had any rela-
tion to the gay community was One, Inc. v. Olesen.111 The per curiam
opinion of the Court is one sentence long and yet, says so much.112 One
Incorporated published a magazine entitled “One, The Homosexual
Magazine.”113 The United States Postal Service had determined that
the magazine was “obscene, lewd, lascivious” and therefore refused
to distribute the magazine.114 The trial court upheld the decision of the
Postmaster,115 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit upheld the decision.116 The magazine appealed to the Supreme
Court, and in a one sentence opinion, the Supreme Court granted
108. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (ruling preemptory challenges in
jury voir dire cannot be used on the basis of race); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(ruling miscegenation laws unconstitutional); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) (ruling segregation unconstitutional); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
223 (1944) (upholding Japanese internment); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548,
550–51 (1896) (upholding the doctrine of separate but equal); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (ruling facially neutral laws applied in a racially discriminatory
manner violate equal protection); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1857) (ruling
black men, whether born of free men or slaves, had no standing in court).
109. See U.S. CONST. amend XIX; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (upholding
women’s right to choose abortion).
110. See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371, 371 (1958); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d
772, 773 (1957).
111. Christianna Silva, All the Times the Supreme Court Has Ruled on LGBT Rights,
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 23, 2017, 2:38 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/all-times-supreme
-court-has-ruled-lgbt-rights-720883 [https://perma.cc/LT8A-NTQU].
112. See Olesen, 355 U.S. at 371.
113. Olesen, 241 F.2d at 773.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 779.
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certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit,117 signify-
ing the first victory of gay rights, finding that the homosexual ma-
terial in the magazine was not obscene.118
While the LGB community may have found victory in One, Inc.,
the plight of LGB people did not become a public issue until Saturday,
June 28, 1969, when officers of the New York City Police Department
raided the Stonewall Inn, a bar frequented by the LGBT commu-
nity.119 In the past, when police raided locations where the LGBT com-
munity congregated, crowds would disperse, but not this night.120
Instead, thousands began to fight back against the police, “chanting
and throwing objects” as the police began arresting employees and
patrons of the bar.121 Eventually, thousands joined the uprising.122 The
Stonewall Riots are “regarded by many as the single most important”
event that led to the development of the modern LGBT civil rights
movement.123 With increased visibility came increased discrimination.
Sodomy laws across the United States directly affected the gay
community since sodomy, as defined by the Georgia statute in
Bowers v. Hardwick, criminalized sex acts “involving the sex organs
of one person and the mouth or anus of another.”124 In ruling that
the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy was constitutional, the
Court found, using rational basis scrutiny for the non-suspect class
of sexual orientation, that,
[e]ven if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right,
[Hardwick] asserts that there must be a rational basis for the
law and that there is none in this case other than the presumed
belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.125
The Court then ruled that even if that were the case, there was a
rational basis for the law and refused to invalidate the law “of some
25 [sic] states” on this basis.126 The gay community’s “loss” in Bowers
showed that even when presented with issues of discrimination
117. Olesen, 355 U.S. at 371.
118. Id.; Silva, supra note 111.
119. Stonewall National Monument, NAT’L PARK SERV. (2017), https://www.nps.gov
/places/stonewall.htm [https://perma.cc/FW4H-TW7M].
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1 (1986) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2
(1984)).
125. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
126. Id.
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against sexual orientation, the Court was unwilling to grant protec-
tions to the LGB community.127
The first major Supreme Court victory for gay rights occurred
in Romer v. Evans, when the Court held that a Colorado constitu-
tional amendment denying any type of “[p]rotected [s]tatus” for
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals128 was unconstitutional.129 The Court
ruled that “Amendment 2 bars homosexuals from securing . . . legal
protections for this targeted class in . . . housing, sale of real estate,
insurance, health and welfare services, private education, and em-
ployment.”130 The Court then found that Amendment 2 not only
failed to meet the burden of rational basis scrutiny, but “defie[d]”
it.131 The Court’s analysis of Amendment 2 then goes on to say that
the “disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific
protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence.”132
In its conclusion, the Court found “Amendment 2 classifie[d] homo-
sexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them
unequal to everyone else,” finding that “[a] State cannot so deem a
class of persons a stranger to its laws.”133 The fact that the Court
used rational basis scrutiny in striking down a law discriminating
against LGB individuals demonstrates that the biases shown in
Bowers were starting to dissipate.134
Bowers was finally overturned in 2003 with the Court’s decision
in Lawrence v. Texas, which ruled that a Texas statute criminalizing
same-sex sodomy was unconstitutional.135 Rather than analyzing the
statute under an equal protection lens, the Court utilized a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause analysis to find that the petitioners
have a “right to liberty under the Due Process Clause” which entitles
them “to engage in their conduct without intervention of the govern-
ment.”136 The Court, utilizing rational basis scrutiny, found that “[t]he
Texas statute [prohibiting consensual, same-sex sodomy] furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.”137 The Lawrence deci-
sion, in overruling Bowers, allowed LGB individuals to enjoy the
127. See id.
128. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996).
129. Id. at 623.
130. Id. at 629.
131. Id. at 631–32.
132. Id. at 633.
133. Id. at 635.
134. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986).
135. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
136. Id. at 578.
137. Id.
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closeness of intimate relationships with their partners without fear
of arrest; however, there was another major hurdle to overcome.138
The next step in the fight for gay rights was the recognition of
same-sex marriage. States began considering the idea of same-sex
marriage in the 1990s after the Court’s ruling in Romer.139 In light
of this increased drive for legalizing gay marriage, Congress passed
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), “which excludes a same-sex
partner from the definition of ‘spouse’ as that term is used in federal
statutes.”140 As a result, same-sex partners who wed in states or
countries which permitted same-sex marriage or civil unions under
state law were denied federal spousal benefits.141 Edith Windsor’s
wife, Thea Spyer, died in 2009.142 Married in Canada, the couple re-
sided in New York City, but when Spyer died and willed her estate
to Windsor, Windsor was denied the marital exemption of the federal
estate tax because under DOMA, the tax exemption would only be
applied to opposite-sex couples where “any interest in property which
passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse.”143
Because DOMA defined marriage as “only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife,”144 Windsor was not able
to claim the estate tax exemption.145 Windsor challenged DOMA under
a theory that the law violated her Fifth Amendment Due Process
rights, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.146
In finding DOMA unconstitutional, the Court found,
[t]he class to which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints
are those persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made
lawful by the state. DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed
by a State entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their
own liberty. . . . The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to
injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to
protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this
protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less
respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.147
138. Id. at 578–79.
139. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2679 (2013).
140. Id. at 2682.
141. Id. at 2683.
142. Id.
143. 26 U.S.C.A. § 2056(a) (West 1997).
144. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1996).
145. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2679.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2695–96.
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leges granted to opposite-sex couples in various states, regardless of
that state’s own same-sex union recognition, but it also granted the
federal rights of married couples to same-sex partners joined legally
under the laws of their respective states.148 That is not to say the
majority opinion was met with universal praise.149 In fact, three jus-
tices filed lengthy dissenting opinions, joined by a fourth.150 How-
ever, two years later, the Court would finally rule on the biggest gay
rights case in Court history.151
James Obergefell and John Arthur married on a tarmac in
Maryland, on board a medical transport plane because Ohio did not
recognize same-sex marriage.152 Three months after their wedding,
John passed away after a short battle with amyotrophic lateral sclero-
sis (ALS).153 Because Ohio did not recognize gay marriage, Obergefell
was not “listed as the surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certifi-
cate.”154 The Court was faced with the question of whether marriage
was a fundamental right protected under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and whether denying same-sex couples the right to marry was
constitutional.155 The Court found that marriage was a fundamental
right guaranteed to all Americans.156 In the majority opinion, Justice
Anthony Kennedy outlined the four factors the Court used to deter-
mine that marriage was a fundamental right.157
First, the Court analyzed “the right to personal choice regarding
marriage” as being “inherent in the concept of individual auton-
omy.”158 The Court opined that marriage is a choice which shapes an
individual’s destiny, which allows those who enter into a marital
bond the ability to find “expression, intimacy, and spirituality.”159
Kennedy further wrote “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two
men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to
148. See id. at 2680–81, 2696.
149. See id. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Windsor,
133 S. Ct. at 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined both Justices Scalia and
Alito in their dissents.
150. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 2711 (Alito, J. dissenting). Justice Thomas joined both Justices Scalia and Alito
in their dissents.
151. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
152. Id. at 2494.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2606.
156. Id. at 2607.
157. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599–601.
158. Id. at 2599.
159. Id.
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make such profound choices.”160 To paraphrase, the Court found that
choosing to enter into marriage is a right ingrained in the individual
as part of his exercise of individual autonomy.161
Second, the Court found that marriage is a fundamental right
“because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its im-
portance to the committed individuals.”162 Citing to Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Court found,
[m]arriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.163
The Court then looked to its decision in Lawrence noting that while
it struck down as unconstitutional a law criminalizing same-sex
intimate conduct, “it does not achieve the full promise of liberty” be-
cause “it does not follow that freedom stops there.”164 By determining
that marriage is unique in the union it creates, the Court found that
it is a fundamental right.165
Third, the Court held that marriage is a fundamental right be-
cause “it safeguards children and families.”166 The Court found that
“same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their chil-
dren, whether biological or adopted,”167 while also finding “[a]n ability,
desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been a prerequi-
site for a valid marriage in any State,”168 and rejecting the govern-
ment’s argument that granting marriage rights to same-sex couples
would not safeguard children and families.169 Not only did the Court
find marriage to be a fundamental right because of the implications
on safeguarding children and families, but it further acknowledged
the parental possibilities of same-sex couples.170
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599–600 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965)) (Griswold found that a Connecticut law which banned the use of contracep-
tives by married persons was unconstitutional).
164. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600; see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–79 (2003).
165. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594, 2605–06.
166. Id. at 2600.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2601.
169. Id. at 2607.
170. Id. at 2600–01.
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Fourth, and finally, the Court analyzed marriage’s position as
“a keystone of our social order.”171 Citing Maynard v. Hill, the Court
“explain[ed] that marriage is ‘the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor prog-
ress.’ ”172 Marriage is a fundamental part of society and society in
turn has supported married couples through “material benefits to
protect and nourish the union” including “inheritance and property
rights . . . spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access;
medical decision-making authority” among many other rights and
benefits.173 In reviewing the rights and privileges awarded married
couples, the Court found “[t]here is no difference between same- and
opposite-sex couples” and “[y]et by virtue of their exclusion from
[marriage], same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits
that the States have linked to marriage.”174 Because of the impor-
tance of marriage in society, and DOMA’s obstruction to same-sex
couples, the Court found marriage to be a fundamental right being
unconstitutionally denied to same-sex couples.175
Having found that marriage is a fundamental right, the Court
ruled “[t]he Constitution . . . does not permit the State to bar same-sex
couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the
opposite sex.”176 In its final holding, the Court ruled “same-sex couples
may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States” and that
“there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful
same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its
same-sex character.”177 And with that, the Court recognized the
right of same-sex couples to marry within any jurisdiction in the
United States.178
B. Where We Fall Short: Current Issues Facing the LGB
Community
While the Court may have recognized same-sex marriage, the
LGB community continues to face discriminatory issues. As of 2017,
only twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have laws that
protect the LGB community in employment practices in the public and
private sector.179 Additionally, seventeen states have no protections
171. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
172. Id. (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2597, 2602.
176. Id. at 2607.
177. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607–08.
178. Id.
179. State Maps of Laws & Policies: Employment, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www
.hrc.org/state-maps/employment [https://perma.cc/Q8Z3-FZ64] (last updated June 11, 2018).
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for the LGB community in employment at all.180 Only sixteen states
and the District of Columbia protect the LGB community in the field
of education.181 Fifteen states do not have hate crime legislation that
protects the LGB community.182 Only twenty-two states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia protect the LGB community in the area of housing.183
Finally, only twenty-one states and the District of Columbia passed
legislation which protects the LGB community against discrimination
in public accommodations.184 While gay couples have the right to
marry, there are still great shortages in protections against discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation.185 The only way the LGB commu-
nity has any real chance at securing these protections is through the
Supreme Court granting suspect classification to sexual orientation.
III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION MEETS THE BURDEN FOR
SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION
Having previously outlined the “test” for suspectness in the In-
troduction, Part III of this Article will analyze sexual orientation
through the lens of the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurispru-
dence and show that it meets the standard for suspect classification.
A. A Discrete and Insular Minority
As previously outlined, a discrete and insular minority is one
which is visible in a way that makes identification easy and interacts
with others in various social contexts.186 There has never been a time
where the LGB community has been more visible than right now.
When Ellen Degeneres came out as a lesbian on the cover of Time
in 1997, it was the first time an openly gay actor would be playing
180. Id. (including West Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee,
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South
Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Idaho).
181. State Maps of Laws & Policies: Education, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc
.org/state-maps/education [https://perma.cc/TFS8-8B7Z] (last updated Dec. 1, 2017).
182. State Maps of Laws & Policies: Hate Crimes, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www
.hrc.org/state-maps/hate-crimes [https://perma.cc/LD7K-683C] (last updated Dec. 1, 2017).
183. State Maps of Laws & Policies: Housing, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc
.org/state-maps/housing [https://perma.cc/A8PQ-BQV4] (last updated June 11, 2018).
184. State Maps of Laws & Policies: Public Accommodations, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/public-accommodations [https://perma.cc/PQ4E-DNJR]
(last updated June 11, 2018) (noting that public accommodations include any public or
private entity that provides services to the general public).
185. See Susan Milligan, Gay Rights Activists Face New Hurdles, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 23,
2017, 3:46 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-01-23/gay
-rights-activists-face-new-hurdles (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
186. See Strauss, supra note 9, at 149 (quoting Ackerman, supra note 43, at 729).
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an openly gay lead character on a network television show.187 Twenty
years after the publication of the cover, Degeneres has been joined
by numerous other celebrities who have come out, including United
States Senator Tammy Baldwin,188 Apple CEO Tim Cook,189 and
journalist and news anchor Anderson Cooper.190 In addition to the
numerous prominent individuals who have publically acknowledged
their sexuality, there are countless advocacy groups that have become
household names such as the Human Rights Campaign which advo-
cates for LGB inclusion, the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defama-
tion (GLAAD) which promotes LGB causes, and The Trevor Project
which advocates for and helps protect at-risk LGBTQ youth.191 Be-
cause of these celebrities, politicians, journalists, businessmen and
women, the visibility of the LGB community has never been more
apparent; the ability of the LGB community to participate in busi-
ness, politics, entertainment, and other facets of society proves that
the LGB community is a discrete and insular minority under the
above definition. Furthermore, the fact that LGBT individuals only
comprise between 5% and 10% of the population further supports
the idea that this group is a minority for the purposes of equal pro-
tection analysis.192
B. History of Discrimination
Until the 2003 Lawrence decision, sodomy was outlawed in
several states in the nation, and those laws were often aimed at the
gay community’s ability to have intimacy within same-sex relation-
ships.193 However, the history of discrimination against the gay
community does not rest solely in Supreme Court stare decisis. Until
187. Lily Rothman, Read the ‘Yep, I’m Gay’ Ellen Degeneres Interview from 20 Years Ago,
TIME (Apr. 13, 2017), http://time.com/4728994/ellen-degeneres-1997-coming-out-cover
[https://perma.cc/65D3-U6BU].
188. About Tammy Baldwin, U.S. SENATE, https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/about
[https://perma.cc/C6ZQ-T9KW].
189. Brett Molina, Apple CEO Tim Cook: ‘I’m Proud to be Gay,’ USA TODAY (Oct. 30,
2014, 7:33 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/10/30/tim-cook-comes-out
/18165361 [https://perma.cc/HY7R-BTG5].
190. Gael Fashingbauer Cooper, Anderson Cooper: ‘I’m Gay, Always Have Been,
Always Will Be,’ TODAY (Oct. 14, 2016, 11:51 AM), https://www.today.com/news/anderson
-cooper-im-gay-always-have-been-always-will-be-858165 [https://perma.cc/GPN4-DHAA].
191. See About GLAAD, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/about [https://perma.cc/BL8M
-UYX5]; About the Trevor Project, TREVOR PROJECT, https://www.thetrevorproject.org
/about [https://perma.cc/L2EE-AGY9]; HRC Story, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc
.org/hrc-story [https://perma.cc/QRY9-RPTK].
192. Powers, supra note 7, at 389; see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407, 440 n.30 (2008).
193. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003).
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1990, United States immigration laws prevented homosexuals from
entering the country, and it was not until 2009 that the ban on HIV-
positive individuals ended.194 Even though the Supreme Court in-
validated sodomy laws in Lawrence, the lasting effect of those laws
“accumulated a cultural force that extends far beyond their now
technically defunct legal reach.”195 Throughout history, the media
has portrayed homosexuality in a negative light, perpetuating “[q]ueer
criminal archetypes” that referred to LGB criminals as “perverts,
predators, deviants, psychopaths, child molesters . . . bull dykes,
pansies, girlie-men, monsters, he-shes, and freak shows.”196 No ex-
ample of equating homosexuality with criminality is more alarming
than the response to the sexual abuse allegations against the Catholic
Church.197 “[W]hen the scandal broke publicly in 2002, Church au-
thorities, already steeped in homophobia, scapegoated gay men in
the priesthood and seminary” by instituting a witch hunt for “evidence
of homosexuality” within the church, finding that such “deep-seated
homosexual tendencies” was the cause of the abuse.198 However,
rampant discrimination against LGB individuals does not stop there.
In 2015, 17.7% of those who reported hate crimes were victimized
because of their sexual orientation.199 Of those, 62.2% were gay men,
13.5% were lesbians, and 2.8% were bisexual.200 Until its repeal in
2011, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT), prevented LGB service members
from living an openly LGB lifestyle.201 An estimated 100,000 service
members were discharged for their sexual orientation under “less-
than-honorable” conditions which prevented them from receiving
veterans’ benefits, government jobs, employment opportunities, and
other benefits.202 Until 1973, homosexuality was listed as a mental
disorder by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders.203 Combined with the previously stated lack of protections in
employment, education, public accommodations, and housing, the
194. JOEY L. MOGUL, ANDREA J. RITCHIE & KAY WHITLOCK, QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2011).
195. Id. at 10.
196. Id. at 25–26 (emphasis in original).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 34.
199. Hate Crime Statistics, 2015, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 1 (Fall 2016) https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2015/topic-pages/victims_final.pdf.
200. Id. at 2–3.
201. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy, N.Y. TIMES
(July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military.html [https://perma.cc
/4GB7-G7VG].
202. Dave Philipps, Ousted as Gay, Aging Veterans are Battling Again for Honorable Dis-
charges, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/us/gay-veterans
-push-for-honorable-discharges-they-were-denied.html [https://perma.cc/CQM6-45KJ].
203. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
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LGB community has faced, and continues to face, rampant discrimi-
nation in various aspects of life.
In late 2016, Donald Trump was elected President of the United
States.204 He selected, as his Vice Presidential running mate, Mike
Pence, the then-Governor of Indiana.205 As the most powerful man in
government behind the President, Pence’s views on LGB issues raised
alarm for the LGB community.206 He was supportive of a proposed
“constitutional amendment that would have defined marriage as be-
tween a man and a woman,” further indicating he believed living an
LGB lifestyle was a choice and preventing same-sex marriage enforced
“God’s idea.”207 He opposed legislation aimed at banning workplace
discrimination against the LGB community.208 The Trump Administra-
tion’s “war” on the LGB community does not stop there.209 Trump’s
choice for Attorney General was Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions.210
Since his appointment to the Justice Department, Sessions has di-
rected the Department to file “multiple amicus briefs arguing against
LGBT protections” in upcoming Supreme Court cases involving
protections of the LGB community.211 Even after the landmark cases
which recognized same-sex marriage, the Trump Administration’s
hostility to the LGB community shows that even after so many
successes in court, the LGB community still faces discrimination,
even from its own government. After the successes realized under
the Obama Administration,212 the United States is taking a leap
backward in the fight to grant greater protections to the LGB com-
munity. Not only does the LGB community have a documented his-
tory of discrimination, but those same individuals continue to face
widespread discrimination in various aspects of life.213
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C. Political Powerlessness
LGB individuals are vastly underrepresented in legislatures and
positions of power and authority.214 No openly LGB individual has
become a candidate for President or Vice President of the United
States for either major party.215 The United States has only elected
one openly LGB member to the United States Senate.216 There have
been huge strides for LGB rights in many state legislatures, but the
fact remains that even in 2015, at the time the Court recognized
same-sex marriage, the Court was willing to analyze the history of
same-sex marriage debates undertaken in state and federal courts.
It found that in order to counteract legislatures unwilling to protect
them, LGB individuals harmed by discriminatory laws sought redress
in the only forum they found with a path to protections: the Court.217
Even after legislatures and the courts “devoted substantial atten-
tion” to LGB individuals in analyzing “state and local governments,
the military, large and small businesses, labor unions, religious
organizations, law enforcement, civic groups, professional organiza-
tions, and universities,” the Court found that the government’s argu-
ment that “there has been insufficient democratic discourse before
deciding” on the issue of same-sex marriage was insufficient.218 The
Court pointed out that while the issue of same-sex marriage had
been debated, discussed, advocated for, and litigated, there was still
a major split between the various states as to the rights of the LBG
community.219 If the LGB community was a powerful class, able to
exact change through the legislative process, then all fifty states
and the federal government would have protections for LGB individ-
uals; yet, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that the LGB commu-
nity is unable to do that and must seek protection through the courts
under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.220
214. Kit Ramgopal, Only 0.1 Percent of Elected Officials are LGBTQ, New Report Finds,
NBC NEWS (June 22, 2018, 9:09 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/only-0-1
-percent-elected-officials-are-lgbtq-new-report-n885871 [https://perma.cc/9U3Q -3F2C].
215. Frank Bruni, The First Gay President?, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/opinion/sunday/the-first-gay-president.html [https://perma.cc
/H24S-8UY4].
216. Nick Duffy, Republicans Pick ‘Anti-LGBT Extremist’ to Challenge Out Senator
Tammy Baldwin, PINKNEWS (Aug. 15, 2018, 10:26 AM), https://www.pinknews.co.uk
/2018/08/15/republicans-pick-anti-lgbt-extremist-to-challenge-out-senator-tammy
-baldwin [https://perma.cc/LH27-89A8].
217. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
218. Id.
219. See id. at 2597.
220. See supra Section III.C.
2019] THERE’S NOTHING RATIONAL ABOUT IT 429
D. Immutability
Sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic.221 Histori-
cally, courts ruled that homosexuality is not immutable, determining
it to be a behavior rather than a trait.222 However, the facts do not
support this and the Supreme Court has not accepted this either.223
Professor Strauss argues “[s]exual orientation is immutable even if
not biologically determined, and even if a behavioral choice, because
sexuality is a defining characteristic of personhood.”224 While the
Supreme Court, historically, has yet to rule on the immutability of
sexual orientation outright, the Court can easily find sexual orienta-
tion to be immutable because “the Court has never meant strict
immutability in the sense that members of the class must be physi-
cally unable to change or mask the trait defining their class.”225 It
was not until Obergefell that the Court recognized, in dicta, the
widespread determination that “sexual orientation is both a normal
expression of human sexuality and immutable.”226 Given that the
Court has already addressed immutability in Obergefell,227 moving
forward in a case raising the issue of suspect classification for sexual
orientation, the Court should rely on its rationale in Obergefell find-
ing that sexual orientation is, indeed, an immutable characteristic
of a person’s very being.228
E. Relevance of a Group’s Defining Characteristic
The Court must find that sexual orientation does not reflect an
“individual’s ability to participate and contribute to society.”229 Simply
put, “[i]f a trait does not reflect a person’s abilities, it is presump-
tively irrelevant, and the law illegitimately discriminates on the
basis of it.”230 There is overwhelming evidence that shows the LGB
community is not only able to participate and contribute to society,
but that it already does.231 There are countless actors and actresses,
business owners, police officers, soldiers, politicians, religious leaders,
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laborers, parents, children, brothers, sisters, educators, and activ-
ists who all identify as members of the LGB community, but whose
sexual identity has no effect on their career or role in society.232 The
Court alluded to as much in Obergefell by finding that LGB individ-
uals are not only capable of parenting, but already “create loving,
supportive families,”233 proving that LGB individuals can participate
meaningfully in society.
In addition to the legal evidence that shows sexual orientation
meets the standard for heightened scrutiny, there is also wide-
spread support for the elevation of sexual orientation to suspect
classification.234 In a letter to Congress detailing the Justice Depart-
ment’s position in the Windsor case, then–Attorney General Eric
Holder concluded his remarks by stating,
[P]ursuant to the President’s instructions, and upon further notifi-
cation to Congress, I will instruct Department attorneys to advise
courts in other pending DOMA litigation of the President’s and
my conclusions that a heightened standard should apply.235
This was most likely the first time a sitting President had advocated
for the elevation of sexual orientation to a suspect class warranting
heightened scrutiny.236 Support for suspect classification for sexual
orientation does not end with the Executive Branch. Scholars also
support the elevation.237 Writing on the issue, Professor Courtney
Powers argues “the Court should find LGBTs a suspect class, and
apply heightened scrutiny to statutes treating LGBTs differently, on
the basis that LGBTs are a politically powerless minority group.”238
Professor Strauss also argues in favor of suspect classification for
sexual orientation in her analysis of suspect classification in general,
showing how the Court has historically failed to follow its own stan-
dards when considering laws that discriminate based on sexual orien-
tation, opting to rule on issues of fundamental rights rather than
addressing Equal Protection.239 The fact that sexual orientation meets
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the standard set by the Supreme Court for suspect classification,
combined by support in both the governmental and private sectors,
further shows that it is time to elevate sexual orientation as a sus-
pect class and grant it heightened scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
As cases continue to reach the Court addressing discrimination
of LGB members on the basis of their sexual orientation, it is time
the Court recognized what has been established through the de-
cades since Bowers.240 Members of the LGB community are a politi-
cally powerless group.241 Even in light of advances to date, LGBs
must rely on the courts, rather than the legislature, in order for
their rights to be recognized.242 LGBs are a discrete and insular
minority making up only about 10% of the population.243 There is a
lengthy documented history of discrimination based on sexual
orientation and the current Administration shows no sign of protect-
ing the rights of the LGB community.244 Sexual orientation is immu-
table, recognized not only by scholars, but by the Supreme Court in
its opinion in Obergefell.245 Finally, there is no evidence to suggest
that laws discriminating against sexual orientation serve a compel-
ling, important, or legitimate government interest.246 In fact, sexual
orientation is completely irrelevant to the LGB community’s ability
to function in and advance society.247 Combined with this burden,
there is widespread support for granting sexual orientation suspect
classification.248 For these reasons, sexual orientation meets the
standard for suspectness under the “test” developed over the years
by the Supreme Court. As a result, in cases raising a Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim based on sexual orienta-
tion, the Court should apply heightened scrutiny in its analysis.
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